{"id":29425,"date":"2026-03-19T00:35:37","date_gmt":"2026-03-19T00:35:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/davenues.com\/ca\/?p=29425"},"modified":"2026-03-19T17:21:05","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T17:21:05","slug":"toronto-housing-supply-pipeline-benchmark-report-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/davenues.com\/ca\/toronto-housing-supply-pipeline-benchmark-report-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Toronto Housing Supply Pipeline Benchmark Report 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Published by DELUXE AVENUES \u2014 Research Desk<\/strong><\/p>\n

Executive Summary<\/h2>\n

Toronto\u2019s housing challenge is not a lack of planning activity. It is a lack of conversion from planning approvals into completed housing delivery. The city\u2019s 2024 Development Pipeline reached 854,898 proposed residential units<\/strong>, the largest recorded pipeline to date. Yet the same City of Toronto data shows annual average delivery of only 17,888 built units<\/strong> over 2020\u20132024, compared with 46,940 units receiving first planning approval per year<\/strong> and 24,342 units receiving final site-plan approval per year<\/strong>. This indicates that the central structural problem is not whether projects are proposed, but whether they advance efficiently through approval, financing, construction, and completion.<\/p>\n

Toronto\u2019s pipeline is large enough on paper to support long-term population growth. In practice, however, the system leaks housing at multiple stages. A large share of units remains under review, a smaller share reaches active construction, and a smaller share still reaches occupancy. The city\u2019s own pipeline data shows that 86% of proposed residential units are not yet built<\/strong>. CMHC\u2019s 2026 Housing Supply Report reinforces this concern by warning that condominium presales have collapsed, unsold inventory has risen, and tighter financial conditions now threaten the future pipeline of ownership-oriented housing supply, particularly in Toronto.<\/p>\n

This creates a contradiction at the centre of the market. Toronto appears to have a very large housing pipeline, but the conversion of that pipeline into homes is weak. The result is a market in which the headline volume of proposed units overstates the amount of housing likely to arrive in the near term.<\/p>\n

Key Findings<\/h3>\n
    \n
  • Toronto has a conversion problem, not simply a planning problem.<\/strong> The city\u2019s development pipeline is large, but the rate at which units move from proposal to completion remains weak.<\/li>\n
  • Approvals materially exceed completions.<\/strong> Between 2020 and 2024, Toronto approved 234,699 units at first approval stage, versus 89,440 units built over the same period.<\/li>\n
  • Under-review inventory is exceptionally large.<\/strong> More than half of pipeline units remain under review, delaying supply realization.<\/li>\n
  • The composition of supply is heavily condo-led.<\/strong> Condominium units account for the majority of total proposed units, while freehold and family-oriented supply remain limited.<\/li>\n
  • Future ownership supply is at risk.<\/strong> Weak condo presales, rising unsold inventory, and financing strain could reduce future starts even if planning applications remain high.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    1. Toronto Housing Supply Overview<\/h2>\n

    The City of Toronto defines the development pipeline as projects with activity between January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2024. Within this framework, projects are grouped into three broad statuses:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Under Review:<\/strong> projects not yet approved, refused, or still under appeal.<\/li>\n
    • Active:<\/strong> projects that have been approved, have building permits applied for or issued, or are under construction.<\/li>\n
    • Built:<\/strong> projects that became ready for occupancy and\/or were completed within the pipeline window.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      This distinction matters because a large pipeline does not guarantee near-term housing delivery. The development pipeline is best understood as a stock of potential supply at different levels of readiness. The market impact depends not on the gross size of the pipeline, but on how efficiently units advance through each stage.<\/p>\n

      Toronto\u2019s 2024 pipeline contains 2,335 projects and 854,898 proposed residential units. The city estimates that this amount of pipeline could accommodate roughly 1.04 million additional people over Toronto\u2019s 2024 population. However, that theoretical capacity should not be mistaken for imminent housing delivery.<\/p>\n

      2. Supply Pipeline Benchmark<\/h2>\n

      Pipeline stage breakdown<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Stage<\/td>\nUnits<\/td>\nShare of total pipeline<\/td>\nInterpretation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Under Review<\/td>\n432,376<\/td>\n50.6%<\/td>\nUnits still subject to planning review, appeal, or unresolved approvals<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Active<\/td>\n307,056<\/td>\n35.9%<\/td>\nApproved or progressing through permit\/construction stages<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Approved<\/td>\n196,914<\/td>\n23.0%<\/td>\nSubset of active projects with delegated\/council approval<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Building Permit Applied For<\/td>\n38,779<\/td>\n4.5%<\/td>\nSubset of active projects transitioning toward work on site<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Under Construction<\/td>\n71,363<\/td>\n8.3%<\/td>\nProjects physically progressing toward delivery<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Built<\/td>\n115,466<\/td>\n13.5%<\/td>\nProjects ready for occupancy and\/or completed within the pipeline window<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Total pipeline<\/td>\n854,898<\/td>\n100.0%<\/td>\nTotal proposed units with activity in 2020\u20132024<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

      The stage distribution shows that Toronto\u2019s pipeline is highly front-loaded. Over half of all proposed units are still under review, while only a comparatively small portion is under construction. This supports the core thesis of the report: the city\u2019s supply problem is not primarily one of insufficient proposals, but one of insufficient throughput.<\/p>\n

      Benchmark table for report design team<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Stage<\/td>\nUnits<\/td>\n% of Total<\/td>\nAvg Time to Next Stage<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Proposed \/ Under Review<\/td>\n432,376<\/td>\n50.6%<\/td>\nMulti-year; often delayed by planning, appeals, and revisions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      First Approval Achieved<\/td>\n234,699*<\/td>\n27.5% of total pipeline equivalent<\/td>\nOften 1\u20133+ years to final planning\/permit readiness<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Final Planning Approval (Site Plan)<\/td>\n121,711*<\/td>\n14.2% of total pipeline equivalent<\/td>\nOften 6\u201324+ months to permit and construction mobilization<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Under Construction<\/td>\n71,363<\/td>\n8.3%<\/td>\nCommonly 18\u201336+ months to completion depending on product type<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Built \/ Ready for Occupancy<\/td>\n115,466<\/td>\n13.5%<\/td>\nDelivered stock<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

      *The first-approval and site-plan figures are cumulative 2020\u20132024 approvals and should be used as conversion references rather than strict point-in-time pipeline bins.<\/p>\n

      3. Supply Conversion Analysis<\/h2>\n

      Toronto\u2019s supply leakage becomes clearer when approval and build data are viewed together.<\/p>\n

      From 2020 to 2024:<\/p>\n

        \n
      • 234,699 units<\/strong> received first planning approval.<\/li>\n
      • 121,711 units<\/strong> received final site-plan approval.<\/li>\n
      • 89,440 units<\/strong> were built.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        This implies several structural realities.<\/p>\n

        First, Toronto approved nearly three times as many units at first approval as it built over the same period. Second, even after final planning approval, the path to construction remains materially slower than the path to approval. Third, the pipeline can continue to expand even while actual completions underperform, creating a misleading impression that supply is keeping pace.<\/p>\n

        Indicative conversion metrics<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Conversion measure<\/td>\nResult<\/td>\nInterpretation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Built as a share of first approvals (2020\u20132024 cumulative)<\/td>\n38.1%<\/td>\nA minority of first-approved units translated into built units during the same period<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Built as a share of final approvals (2020\u20132024 cumulative)<\/td>\n73.5%<\/td>\nFinal approval improves delivery probability, but still leaves leakage<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Under construction as share of total pipeline<\/td>\n8.3%<\/td>\nOnly a small portion of pipeline is physically being delivered<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Units not yet built as share of total pipeline<\/td>\n86%<\/td>\nMost pipeline supply remains unrealized<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

        Visual funnel concept for design team<\/h3>\n

        Proposed \/ Under Review \u2192 First Approval \u2192 Final Approval \/ Site Plan \u2192 Permit \/ Construction \u2192 Completion<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The funnel should emphasize that volume remains high at the top but narrows sharply at construction and completion. The largest drop-off occurs before physical building activity begins.<\/p>\n

        4. Annual Housing Delivery Benchmark<\/h2>\n

        The City of Toronto\u2019s annual build data for 2020\u20132024 shows the volatility of realized supply:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Year<\/td>\nUnits approved (OPA \/ rezoning)<\/td>\nUnits approved (site plan)<\/td>\nUnits built<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        2020<\/td>\n22,663<\/td>\n25,924<\/td>\n17,988<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        2021<\/td>\n32,556<\/td>\n18,057<\/td>\n17,920<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        2022<\/td>\n73,047<\/td>\n19,733<\/td>\n16,870<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        2023<\/td>\n53,637<\/td>\n28,759<\/td>\n22,367<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        2024<\/td>\n52,796<\/td>\n29,238<\/td>\n14,295<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        5-year average<\/strong><\/td>\n46,940<\/strong><\/td>\n24,342<\/strong><\/td>\n17,888<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

        The build pattern is notable for two reasons. First, completions remain materially below approvals throughout the period. Second, 2024 built output dropped to 14,295 units despite the record size of the overall pipeline.<\/p>\n

        This matters in the context of Toronto\u2019s housing target of 285,000 homes by 2031<\/strong>. To meet this target from 2025 onward, average annual delivery would need to remain materially stronger than recent realized completion levels. A pipeline alone does not satisfy this requirement; only completed units do.<\/p>\n

        5. Construction Activity Benchmark<\/h2>\n

        Construction activity represents the narrowest part of Toronto\u2019s pipeline funnel. Of the 854,898 proposed units in the 2024 pipeline, only 71,363 units were under construction at the reporting date. This is far below the volume implied by total proposals and highlights the limited share of the pipeline that is meaningfully progressing toward near-term occupancy.<\/p>\n

        CMHC\u2019s 2026 Housing Supply Report adds an important macro view. While national housing starts rose in 2025, Toronto was the notable exception among major markets, with starts falling well below historical averages on a per-capita basis. CMHC\u2019s 2026 Housing Market Outlook also projects that Ontario housing starts will fall to near two-decade lows in 2026, driven by very low condominium pre-construction sales.<\/p>\n

        The implication is clear: Toronto\u2019s pipeline may remain large in planning terms even as construction throughput slows.<\/p>\n

        Key construction influences<\/h3>\n
          \n
        • Interest rates and financing costs:<\/strong> Higher financing costs weaken project feasibility and delay site mobilization.<\/li>\n
        • Presale weakness:<\/strong> Condo-led projects depend on presale absorption to secure financing. Lower presales can prevent approved projects from starting.<\/li>\n
        • Construction costs:<\/strong> Elevated labour and material costs compress developer margins and reduce willingness to proceed.<\/li>\n
        • Capital discipline:<\/strong> Lenders and equity partners are more selective in uncertain market conditions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          6. Condo vs Low-Rise Supply Benchmark<\/h2>\n

          Toronto\u2019s pipeline is overwhelmingly apartment- and condo-oriented.<\/p>\n

          According to the City of Toronto, the 2024 pipeline contains:<\/p>\n

            \n
          • 608,249 condominium units (71.1%)<\/strong><\/li>\n
          • 131,676 rental units (15.4%)<\/strong><\/li>\n
          • 4,266 freehold units (0.5%)<\/strong><\/li>\n
          • 110,707 units with tenure not yet determined (12.9%)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            This tenure profile highlights a structural imbalance. The city\u2019s future supply is heavily concentrated in vertical product, while ground-related ownership supply remains extremely limited. Even within the rental category, purpose-built rental is growing from a relatively low base versus condominium supply.<\/p>\n

            For households seeking family-sized ownership housing, this composition matters. Toronto may have a large numerical pipeline, but it is not evenly distributed across housing forms. The supply that moves forward most readily is not always the supply that matches household needs most directly.<\/p>\n

            7. Future Supply Risk (2026\u20132030)<\/h2>\n

            Toronto\u2019s future supply outlook is vulnerable despite the record headline pipeline.<\/p>\n

            CMHC\u2019s Spring 2026 Housing Supply Report states that condominium presales have collapsed, unsold inventory has surged, and tighter financial conditions are threatening the future pipeline of ownership-oriented housing supply, particularly in Toronto and Vancouver. CMHC also notes that Toronto\u2019s starts were well below the historical average in 2025 and that the market faces rising risk of future ownership supply weakness.<\/p>\n

            This means Toronto may face a two-speed supply problem:<\/p>\n

              \n
            1. A very large stock of proposed units at the planning stage<\/strong>, and<\/li>\n
            2. A weakening ability to convert those proposals into starts and completions<\/strong>, especially in condo-led ownership segments.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              In practical terms, the market may still look oversupplied in select condo submarkets today while simultaneously setting up a future shortage of delivered homes later in the decade.<\/p>\n

              8. Global Benchmark Comparison<\/h2>\n

              Toronto\u2019s development challenge looks different when compared with selected global gateway cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
              City<\/td>\nPipeline \/ delivery profile<\/td>\nDelivery speed<\/td>\nSupply efficiency<\/td>\nKey constraint<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
              Toronto<\/td>\nVery large proposed pipeline; relatively modest construction and completion throughput<\/td>\nModerate to slow<\/td>\nWeak conversion from planning to completion<\/td>\nApprovals-to-delivery leakage, condo financing risk<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              Dubai<\/td>\nMarket-supported development with fast execution and strong developer-government alignment<\/td>\nFast<\/td>\nHigh responsiveness when financing and demand align<\/td>\nCyclicality and project timing risk<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              London<\/td>\nLarge need base, substantial institutional framework, but development pace constrained by planning and viability<\/td>\nModerate<\/td>\nMixed; approvals do not always translate quickly to delivery<\/td>\nPlanning complexity, viability, affordable housing obligations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              New York City<\/td>\nStrong long-term absorption and large citywide production base, but highly uneven delivery across neighborhoods<\/td>\nModerate<\/td>\nBetter large-scale delivery than Toronto in recent years, but uneven spatially<\/td>\nZoning constraints, neighborhood opposition, regulatory complexity<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              Hong Kong<\/td>\nHigh-density system with strong state role and formal supply planning<\/td>\nModerate<\/td>\nStronger land-led coordination, though land scarcity remains binding<\/td>\nLand scarcity, affordability, lengthy land development cycle<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

              Comparative insights<\/h3>\n
                \n
              • Toronto vs Dubai:<\/strong> Toronto\u2019s pipeline is larger in relation to its recent annual delivery than Dubai\u2019s, suggesting weaker conversion efficiency. Dubai\u2019s system is more execution-oriented when market demand and capital are aligned.<\/li>\n
              • Toronto vs London:<\/strong> Both cities face approval and viability constraints, but London has a deeper institutional delivery framework and a longer-established policy apparatus for affordable housing and strategic planning.<\/li>\n
              • Toronto vs New York City:<\/strong> New York\u2019s regulatory environment is also complex, but the city added 136,000 homes in the last five years, showing stronger realized output than Toronto\u2019s recent city-level build pace.<\/li>\n
              • Toronto vs Hong Kong:<\/strong> Hong Kong\u2019s market remains heavily constrained by land scarcity, but its supply planning framework is more explicitly tied to long-term state-led land and housing production targets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                9. Key Structural Bottlenecks<\/h2>\n

                Toronto\u2019s supply conversion problem is shaped by several overlapping bottlenecks:<\/p>\n

                1. Planning and appeals friction<\/h3>\n

                A large volume of units remains under review, indicating long lead times before approvals become construction-ready.<\/p>\n

                2. Final-approval-to-start lag<\/h3>\n

                Even after planning approvals are granted, projects must still secure permits, financing, presales, and contractor mobilization.<\/p>\n

                3. Condo dependence<\/h3>\n

                Because the pipeline is heavily condo-led, market softening in the condo segment has an outsized effect on total starts and future completions.<\/p>\n

                4. Cost inflation<\/h3>\n

                Construction cost inflation reduces feasibility, especially for marginal projects and family-oriented product.<\/p>\n

                5. Capital market discipline<\/h3>\n

                Projects increasingly need stronger presale performance and more conservative underwriting to proceed.<\/p>\n

                6. Policy friction<\/h3>\n

                Layered policy requirements can improve planning outcomes but may also add time, uncertainty, and cost if not paired with delivery-oriented implementation.<\/p>\n

                10. Key Insights<\/h2>\n
                  \n
                1. Pipeline size does not equal supply.<\/strong> The stock of proposed units materially overstates likely near-term completions.<\/li>\n
                2. Toronto\u2019s housing system is constrained by conversion efficiency.<\/strong> The main bottleneck lies between proposal, approval, financing, construction, and delivery.<\/li>\n
                3. Completions remain far below proposal volumes.<\/strong> Recent annual delivery is not keeping pace with the scale of the pipeline.<\/li>\n
                4. The market is highly exposed to condo conditions.<\/strong> Weak condo presales can impair total supply formation.<\/li>\n
                5. Final approvals matter more than headline proposals.<\/strong> Projects with final approvals have better odds of converting to delivered units, but still face material leakage.<\/li>\n
                6. Family-oriented ownership supply remains limited.<\/strong> Numerical pipeline growth does not necessarily solve structural supply mix issues.<\/li>\n
                7. Future supply risk is rising despite record pipeline levels.<\/strong> A weakening start environment today can translate into fewer completions later.<\/li>\n
                8. Execution is now the defining housing variable.<\/strong> Planning policy alone will not solve the delivery gap.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  11. Actionable Insights<\/h2>\n

                  For investors<\/h3>\n

                  Focus on submarkets and product types where actual construction progress is visible rather than relying on headline pipeline counts. In a slower-start environment, completed and near-complete inventory can become more valuable than early-stage pipeline exposure.<\/p>\n

                  For developers<\/h3>\n

                  Projects with stronger tenure diversification, more resilient financing structures, and clearer end-user demand may outperform pure speculative condo strategies. Delivery certainty is becoming a competitive advantage.<\/p>\n

                  For policymakers<\/h3>\n

                  Success metrics should shift from total proposed units toward stage-by-stage conversion, time-to-approval, time-to-start, and time-to-completion. The core policy challenge is throughput, not only volume.<\/p>\n

                  For buyers<\/h3>\n

                  Headline claims of \u201cmassive future supply\u201d should be treated cautiously. In many cases, the relevant supply is the stock that is already under construction or close to occupancy, not the total proposal count.<\/p>\n

                  12. Recommended Charts and Tables for Design Team<\/h2>\n
                    \n
                  1. Supply funnel chart<\/strong>
                    \nProposed \/ Under Review \u2192 First Approval \u2192 Final Approval \u2192 Permit Applied \u2192 Under Construction \u2192 Built<\/li>\n
                  2. 5-year completions trend chart<\/strong>
                    \nAnnual built units from 2020 to 2024, with comparison lines for first approvals and site-plan approvals.<\/li>\n
                  3. Pipeline stage breakdown table<\/strong>
                    \nUnits and percentage share for Under Review, Active, Under Construction, and Built.<\/li>\n
                  4. Tenure composition chart<\/strong>
                    \nCondominium, rental, freehold, and undetermined share of total pipeline.<\/li>\n
                  5. Global comparison table<\/strong>
                    \nToronto, Dubai, London, New York City, and Hong Kong across delivery speed, supply efficiency, and key constraints.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    Conclusion<\/h2>\n

                    Toronto\u2019s housing challenge is often described as a shortage of planned supply. The data suggests a more precise diagnosis. The city has built an exceptionally large development pipeline, but the conversion of that pipeline into completed housing remains too weak to close the gap between need and delivery.<\/p>\n

                    The central issue is therefore not whether Toronto can generate enough proposals. It is whether the system can move enough of those proposals through approvals, financing, construction, and occupancy in time to matter. On this measure, Toronto remains constrained.<\/p>\n

                    A city can have a record pipeline and still underdeliver. Toronto\u2019s challenge is not planning. It is execution.<\/p>\n

                    APPENDIX:<\/strong><\/p>\n

                    1) City of Toronto \u2014 Development Pipeline<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.toronto.ca\/city-government\/data-research-maps\/research-reports\/planning-development\/development-pipeline\/<\/p>\n

                    2) City of Toronto \u2014 Development Pipeline 2024 PDF<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.toronto.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/964b-CityPlanning-Development-Pipeline-2024.pdf<\/p>\n

                    3) City of Toronto \u2014 Planning and Housing Committee item confirming 2024 pipeline totals<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/secure.toronto.ca\/council\/agenda-item.do?item=2025.PH22.1<\/p>\n

                    4) CMHC \u2014 Spring 2026 Housing Supply Report<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca\/professionals\/housing-markets-data-and-research\/market-reports\/housing-market\/housing-supply-report<\/p>\n

                    5) CMHC \u2014 Spring 2026 Housing Supply Report news release<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca\/media-newsroom\/news-releases\/2026\/spring-2026-housing-supply-report<\/p>\n

                    6) CMHC \u2014 Housing Market Outlook 2026<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca\/professionals\/housing-markets-data-and-research\/market-reports\/housing-market\/housing-market-outlook<\/p>\n

                    7) CMHC \u2014 Monthly Housing Starts and Other Construction Data Tables<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca\/professionals\/housing-markets-data-and-research\/housing-data\/data-tables\/housing-market-data\/monthly-housing-starts-construction-data-tables<\/p>\n

                    8) Statistics Canada \u2014 Building permits (latest releases)<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www150.statcan.gc.ca\/n1\/daily-quotidien\/260312\/dq260312c-eng.htm<\/p>\n

                    https:\/\/www150.statcan.gc.ca\/n1\/daily-quotidien\/251212\/dq251212a-eng.htm<\/p>\n

                    9) NYC official planning source \u2014 Where We Live NYC 2025, Goal 2<\/p>\n

                    goal 2<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n